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Abstract 
This study investigates the effect of port integration in a mixed oligopoly framework where a public 
port compete with private ports under price competition. We formulate two integration models, A-
integration and B-integration, in which the public port integrates with its neighboring private port or 
with a non-adjacent private port, respectively. We demonstrate that the effects of A-integration (B-
integration) will (not) depend on the gross consumer benefit of the cargo shipment B-integration 
always makes society better off. We then examine an endogenous port integration game and show 
that both integration and competition are Nash equilibria under the appropriate government side 
payments, while B-integration can be socially desirable under public finances. 
Keywords: Port integration; Mixed oligopoly; Public ownership; Private ownership; Endogenous 
port integration 
1. Introduction  
In recent decades, port integration has become an important policy issue worldwide due to global 
competition and technological improvement. For instance, China has begun to integrate ports at the 
province level since 2013. Ningbo Zhoushan port is an integration of Ningbo port and Zhoushan port 
in Zhejiang province, which ranked first in global port cargo throughput in 2015. In the Hunaghai 
Bay Region, the Shandong port group was established to operate Qingdao, Rizhao, Yantai, and 
Weihai ports in 2019. In the Bohai Rim Region, Dalian Port annexed Yingkou Port in Liaoning 
province in 2020. Port integration is now also popular elsewhere in the world such as Tokyo Bay Port 




Meanwhile, as many countries moved toward the privatization of public ports, the private 
operation of port facilities has become increasingly popular since the 1970s. According to data from 
the World Bank, more than 70 countries participated in 471 port privatization projects with a total 
investment of 90,117 million USD from 1990 to 2019. Figure 1 illustrates the number of port 
privatizations and total investment in ports globally. 
[Figure 1 should be located here] 
The private ports in the world commonly compete with public ports that might integrate the other 
port. On the one hand, earlier studies of port privatization examined the effect of privatization on 
performance in a competitive mixed market in which the public port competes with private ports. For 
instance, Matsushima and Takauchi (2014) investigated the effect of port privatization on the usage 
fee and profits of ports with different market sizes in an international market. Czerny et al. (2014) 
examined a port privatization choice game and demonstrated that both governments will choose port 
privatization at equilibrium, which can lead to higher social welfare in each country. Lee et al. (2017) 
considered an endogenous timing choice of port structures under both Cournot and Bertrand 
competition in a third-market approach and illustrated that port structure crucially depends on the 
modes of competition.  
On the other hand, many researchers also analyzed port integration and its effect on port prices, 
profits, and social welfare.1 For instance, Ishii et al. (2013) examined the effect of the elasticity of 
demand and the capacity of each port on the equilibrium port charges using a non-cooperative game 
theoretic model. Zhuang et al. (2014) investigated a port competition game in which ports 
endogenously decide on prices in service differentiated duopolies. In addition, Wang et al. (2015) 
reviewed the effect of shoreline resource, port functionality, and port competition optimization on 
port integration in China considering the same hinterland. Álvarez-SanJaime et al. (2015) found that 
the integration of two ports leaves the operators better off, but society worse off. Zhu et al. (2019) 
                                                                
1 Recent analyses also considered environmental pollution with port competition in the maritime industry. For 
example, Homsombat et al. (2013) showed that inter-port competition and pollution spill-over can lead to 
distorted pollution taxation and emission constraints. Pian et al. (2020) examined the strategic interactions 
between port privatization and emission tax policies in an international mixed market. 
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investigated the effects of vertical integration between the terminal operator and a shipping line on 
port expansion plans and illustrated that vertical integration can increase the participating carrier’s 
output and improve social welfare. 
In the context of port integration within a three-port model, Fan et al. (2015) demonstrated that 
a collaborative strategy can increase the profits of the merged ports and benefit the non-merged ports. 
Xing et al. (2018) analyzed the effects of integration between two neighboring ports with a third port 
sharing the same overlapping hinterland in a private oligopoly. The authors found that port integration 
always increases the profits of the port but reduces the consumer surplus and social welfare. Although 
these findings on port competition and integration provide interesting insights, there is scarce 
examination in the literature on the interaction between port integration in a mixed market in which 
public ports compete with private ports.  
In this paper, we explore the effect of port integration in a mixed oligopoly framework where a 
public port compete with private ports under price competition, and demonstrate that our findings 
crucially contrast with those in a private market.2 Specifically, we consider a Hotelling’s linear city 
model in which three ports operate in the port hinterlands. We examine and compare the two 
integration cases. The first case of integration (A-integration) is that the public port merges with its 
neighboring port and the operator of the merged ports maximizes social welfare. The second case of 
integration (B-integration) is that the public port merges with a non-adjacent port and the operator of 
the merged ports competes with the neighboring private port. We demonstrate that the effect of port 
integration on the equilibrium results crucially depends on the types of integration and gross consumer 
benefit. We further examine an endogenous port integration choice game among the different port 
owners. 
The main findings are as follows. First, the effect of A-integration on the price and throughput 
of each port depends on gross consumer benefit, whereas the effect of B-integration on the equilibrium 
results is independent of gross consumer benefit. In particular, only when gross consumer benefit is 
low, A-integration decreases the price of each port and yields a larger throughput of the merged ports 
and a smaller throughput of the non-merged port. The opposite results occur when gross consumer 
                                                                
2 It is noticeable that most analysis in a mixed oligopoly provide contrasting results with those in a private 
oligopoly. For some discussions in recent works, see Lee and Xu (2018). 
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benefit is high. However, B-integration always decreases the price of each port and increases the 
throughput of the merged port and decreases the throughput of the non-merged port. Our results 
contrast with the findings in the private oligopoly setting wherein Xing et al. (2018) showed that port 
integration always leads to a higher price and a smaller total throughput of the merged ports and a 
larger throughput of the non-merged port. 
Second, the effect of port integration on the profits of the port depends on the types of integration 
and values of gross consumer benefit. In particular, A-integration decreases the profits of the merged 
and non-merged ports when gross consumer benefit is low. The opposite results occur otherwise. 
Thus, all ports are less (more) profitable when gross consumer benefit is low (high) under A-
integration. However, B-integration always decreases the profits of the merged and non-merged ports, 
which are independent of gross consumer benefit.  
Third, A-integration improves consumer surplus and social welfare when gross consumer benefit 
is low, whereas B-integration always improves consumer surplus and social welfare. Our results also 
contrast with Xing et al. (2018), who showed that port integration always reduces both consumer 
surplus and social welfare in a private oligopoly, independent of the type of integration. Therefore, 
A-integration makes society better off only when gross consumer benefit is low, whereas B-
integration always makes society better off. 
Finally, we further consider an endogenous port choices game among three ports in a mixed 
market setting and show that no integration is a unique Nash equilibrium if there is no government 
intervention, but it is not socially desirable. We also examine the case in which the government 
provides side payments to the private port that are incentive-compatible with the merged private 
public port. We demonstrate that ports can choose either integration or competition under the 
appropriate government side payments, while B-integration with side payments can be socially 
desirable and supported by public finances. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. 
Section 3 analyzes the no integration case and two integration cases. Section 4 compares the effects 
of port integration on prices, throughput, profits, and social welfare. Section 5 considers an 
endogenous port integration game among three ports. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. The Model 
We consider a Hotelling’s linear city model in which potential cargo shippers (consumers hereafter) 
are uniformly distributed with a density of one consumer per unit of length.3 Figure 2 shows the port 
hinterlands and consumer distribution in the three cities. We denote the 𝑧𝑧 axis as the coastline along 
which the ports are located. There are three ports located in different cities: 𝑧𝑧 = 0 (port 1 in city 
1), 𝑧𝑧 = 1 (port 2 in city 2), and 𝑧𝑧 = 2 (port 3 in city 3). 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 in Figure 2 represents the unit price 
charged by port i, where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3; 𝑣𝑣 denotes the gross consumer benefit of the cargo shipment; 
and 𝑡𝑡 is the unit inland transportation cost the cargo shipper.4 
[Figure 2 should be located here] 
 
We assume that the ports in each city have different ownership structures: port 1 is a public port 
whereas ports 2 and 3 are private ports. This setting assumes common hinterlands and private 
hinterlands. In particular, ports 1 and 2 compete for cargo shippers in (0, 1) and ports 2 and 3 
compete in (1, 2). We refer to these two regions as common hinterlands hereafter. In addition, 
consumers located on the left side of port 1 (i.e., 𝑧𝑧 < 0) or on the right side of port 3 (i.e., 𝑧𝑧 > 2) 
will only choose port 1 or port 3. We refer to these two regions as the private hinterlands of ports 1 
and 3, respectively.  
We will investigate the port integrations induced by fierce competition facing public port 1 and 
a global economic recession. We examine two integration cases. In the first case, ports 1 and 2 merge 
into a public port that competes against the private port, port 3, in one common hinterland in the 
interval (1, 2) . We denote this case as A-integration, where the public port merges with its 
neighboring port, and the operator of the merged ports chooses a uniform price to maximize social 
welfare. In the second case, ports 1 and 3 merge into a public port that competes against the private 
port, port 2, in both common hinterlands in intervals (0,1) and (1, 2). We denote this case as B-
                                                                
3 Kaselimi et al. (2011), Hmsombat et al. (2013), and Xing et al. (2018) adopted this variant of Hotelling’s 
linear city model. 
4 If we consider the other case that the public port is located between the two private ports, then the integration 
equilibrium will be the same with A-integration. In that case, B-integration does not occur. 
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integration, where the public port merges with a non-adjacent port, and the operator of the merged 
ports decides a welfare-maximizing uniform price. 
The net utility for the consumer located at 𝑧𝑧 that chooses a port is  
(i) 𝑈𝑈1𝐿𝐿(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧 and 𝑈𝑈1𝑅𝑅(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧;  
(ii) 𝑈𝑈2𝐿𝐿(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝2 + 𝑡𝑡(𝑧𝑧 − 1) and 𝑈𝑈2𝑅𝑅(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑡𝑡(𝑧𝑧 − 1); and 
(iii) 𝑈𝑈3𝐿𝐿(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝3 + 𝑡𝑡(𝑧𝑧 − 2) and 𝑈𝑈3𝑅𝑅(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝3 − 𝑡𝑡(𝑧𝑧 − 2).  
Thus, we have an indifferent consumer, as follows 
(i) 𝑧𝑧𝑎𝑎 = 𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝1+𝑝𝑝22𝑡𝑡  if 𝑈𝑈1𝑅𝑅(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑈𝑈2𝐿𝐿(𝑧𝑧); 
(ii) 𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏 = 3𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝2+𝑝𝑝32𝑡𝑡  if 𝑈𝑈2𝑅𝑅(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑈𝑈3𝐿𝐿(𝑧𝑧);  
(iii) 𝑧𝑧𝑙𝑙 = − 𝑉𝑉−𝑝𝑝1𝑡𝑡  if 𝑈𝑈1𝐿𝐿(𝑧𝑧) = 0;  
(iv) 𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟 = 2 + 𝑉𝑉−𝑝𝑝3𝑡𝑡  if 𝑈𝑈3𝑅𝑅(𝑧𝑧) = 0.  
From the indifferent consumers of each hinterland, the throughputs of the three ports in the N-
integration model are as follows: 𝑞𝑞1 = �𝑧𝑧𝑙𝑙 − 0� + |𝑧𝑧𝑎𝑎 − 0| = 2𝑣𝑣+𝑡𝑡−3𝑝𝑝1+𝑝𝑝22𝑡𝑡 , 𝑞𝑞2 = |1 − 𝑧𝑧𝑎𝑎| + �𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏 − 1� = 2𝑡𝑡+𝑝𝑝1−2𝑝𝑝2+𝑝𝑝32𝑡𝑡 , and 𝑞𝑞3 = �2 − 𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏�+ |𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟 − 2| = 2𝑣𝑣+𝑡𝑡−3𝑝𝑝3+𝑝𝑝22𝑡𝑡 .                                    (1) 
We assume that each port’s cost function is 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) = 𝐹𝐹 + 12 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, where 𝐹𝐹 = 0 without 
loss of generality.5 Then, the profit of each port is 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 12 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2.                                                       (2) 
The consumer surplus is 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 = ∫ (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�𝑧𝑧𝑙𝑙�0 + ∫ (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑎𝑎0 , 
                                                                
5 When the public and private firms hold the same production technology under constant or decreasing marginal 
costs, the one public firm that monopolizes the market maximizes social welfare. To focus on active mixed 
oligopoly markets, we retain the assumption of increasing marginal costs, as in the standard mixed oligopoly 
literature. In particular, many researchers assume that the public and private firms have the same production 
efficiency and employ a quadratic cost function. For recent works, see Dadpay and Heywood (2006), Lee and 
Xu (2018), and Xu and Lee (2019), among others. 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 = ∫ (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧1−𝑧𝑧𝑎𝑎0 + ∫ (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏−10 , and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3 = ∫ (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝3 − 𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧2−𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏0 + ∫ (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑝𝑝3 − 𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧)𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟−20 .                        (3) 
Social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖=1 , and producer surplus, 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 = ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖=1 : 𝑊𝑊 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶.                                                         (4) 
The ownership structure influences the objective function of the port. We assume that the private port, 
which has characteristics of private property rights, maximizes its own profit, whereas the public port, 
which is fully owned by the government, maximizes the government’s objective, which is social 
welfare. We also assume that the merged private port, which becomes one branch of the public port 
after port integration maximizes the social welfare after integration. 
Finally, to ensure that the common hinterland of the neighboring ports overlap and the two 
neighboring ports compete for consumers located in (0,1) and (1,2), we assume that the gross 
consumers benefit and transportation cost are sufficiently large. That is, the following conditions R 
should hold:  
(R1) 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝2 < 2𝑣𝑣 − 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝1 − 𝑝𝑝2 < 𝑡𝑡  
(R2) 𝑝𝑝2 + 𝑝𝑝3 < 2𝑣𝑣 − 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝2 − 𝑝𝑝3 < 𝑡𝑡 
3. The Analysis 
As a benchmark case, we consider an N-integration case in which each port operator chooses its price 
independently, and then consider two integration cases: A-integration and B-integration, respectively. 
3.1. N-integration 
We first consider an N-integration situation in which each port operator chooses its price 
independently. To ensure that the required conditions R hold in the N-integration case, we assume 
that 𝑣𝑣1 < 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣2.6 
The operator of the public port, port 1, chooses 𝑝𝑝1 to maximize the social welfare in Eq. (4), 
and the operators of the two private ports, ports 2 and 3, choose 𝑝𝑝2 and 𝑝𝑝3 to maximize their own 
profits in Eq. (2), respectively. The first-order conditions are 
                                                                
6 Appendix I provides the values of 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 46). 
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𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑡𝑡+6𝑣𝑣−10𝑝𝑝1−6𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝1+5𝑝𝑝2+2𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝2−𝑝𝑝34𝑡𝑡2 = 0, ∂𝜋𝜋2∂𝑝𝑝2 = 2𝑡𝑡+2𝑡𝑡2+𝑝𝑝1+𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝1−2𝑝𝑝2−4𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝2+𝑝𝑝3+𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝32𝑡𝑡2 = 0, and ∂𝜋𝜋3∂𝑝𝑝3 = 3𝑡𝑡+2𝑡𝑡2+6𝑣𝑣+4𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+3𝑝𝑝2+2𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝2−9𝑝𝑝3−12𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝34𝑡𝑡2 = 0.                                 (5) 
Solving Eq. (5), the price of the ports are as follows:  𝑝𝑝1𝑁𝑁 = 54𝑡𝑡+153𝑡𝑡2+129𝑡𝑡3+26𝑡𝑡4+54𝑣𝑣+180𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+150𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣+4𝑡𝑡3𝑣𝑣3(18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3) ,  𝑝𝑝2𝑁𝑁 = 2(1+𝑡𝑡)(18𝑡𝑡+33𝑡𝑡2+13𝑡𝑡3+9𝑣𝑣+12𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+2𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣)18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3 , and 𝑝𝑝3𝑁𝑁 = (3+2𝑡𝑡)(18𝑡𝑡+39𝑡𝑡2+17𝑡𝑡3+18𝑣𝑣+48𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+22𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣)3(18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3) ,                                   (6) 
where the superscript N denotes the equilibrium results in the N-integration case. Note that the price 
of each port always increases with gross consumer benefit; that is, 
∂𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁∂𝑣𝑣 > 0 where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3. Note 
also that the effect of transportation cost on port prices depends on gross consumer benefit. In 
particular, the price of the ports increases with transportation cost when gross consumer benefit is 
low, while it decreases with transportation cost when gross consumer benefit is high; that is, 
∂𝑝𝑝1𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 
when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣3, ∂𝑝𝑝2𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣4, and ∂𝑝𝑝3𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣5. 
The throughputs of the three ports are 𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁 = 3(6𝑡𝑡+13𝑡𝑡2+7𝑡𝑡3+6𝑣𝑣+18𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+14𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣)18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3 , 𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁 = 2(18𝑡𝑡+33𝑡𝑡2+13𝑡𝑡3+9𝑣𝑣+12𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+2𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣)18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3 , and 𝑞𝑞3𝑁𝑁 = 18𝑡𝑡+39𝑡𝑡2+17𝑡𝑡3+18𝑣𝑣+48𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+22𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3 .                                        (7) 
Note that the throughput of the port always increases with gross consumer benefit, while it decreases 
with transportation cost; that is, 
∂𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁∂𝑣𝑣 > 0 and ∂𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 < 0. 
The profits of the port operators are 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁 = (3+4𝑡𝑡)(18𝑡𝑡+39𝑡𝑡2+13𝑡𝑡3+18𝑣𝑣+42𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+2𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣)(6𝑡𝑡+13𝑡𝑡2+7𝑡𝑡3+6𝑣𝑣+18𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+14𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣)2(18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3)2 , 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁 = 2(1+2𝑡𝑡)(18𝑡𝑡+33𝑡𝑡2+13𝑡𝑡3+9𝑣𝑣+12𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+2𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣)2(18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3)2 , and 𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁 = (3+4𝑡𝑡)(18𝑡𝑡+39𝑡𝑡2+17𝑡𝑡3+18𝑣𝑣+48𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+22𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣)26(18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3)2 .                                   (8) 
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The ports’ profits always increase with gross consumer benefit; that is, 
∂𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁∂𝑣𝑣 > 0. Thus, all three ports 
earn more as gross consumer benefit increases. In addition, the effect of transportation cost on profits 
depends on the location of the ports and gross consumer benefit. In particular, the profits of ports 1 
and 2 increase (decrease) with transportation cost when gross consumer benefit is low (high), whereas 
the profit of port 3 always decreases with transportation cost; that is, 
∂𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 >< 0 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣6, ∂𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 
when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣7, and ∂𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 < 0. Thus, an increase in transportation cost always leads to a lower profit for 
port 3, while it may lead to higher profits for ports 1 and 2 when gross consumer benefit is low. 
The consumer surplus and social welfare are respectively 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 = 𝑡𝑡((2673+11502𝑡𝑡+18513𝑡𝑡2+13260𝑡𝑡3+3692𝑡𝑡4)𝑣𝑣2+4𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣(1944+7857𝑡𝑡+11583𝑡𝑡2+7368𝑡𝑡3+1730𝑡𝑡4)−2(972+9396𝑡𝑡+32211𝑡𝑡2+53226𝑡𝑡3+45696𝑡𝑡4+19494𝑡𝑡5+3245𝑡𝑡6))3(18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3)2  and 
𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 = �1458+11421𝑡𝑡+31320𝑡𝑡2+39249𝑡𝑡3+22680𝑡𝑡4+4876𝑡𝑡5�𝑣𝑣2+4𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡(3+2𝑡𝑡)(324+2268𝑡𝑡+5013𝑡𝑡2+4386𝑡𝑡3+1277𝑡𝑡4)−𝑡𝑡(1944+15876𝑡𝑡+47898𝑡𝑡2+70839𝑡𝑡3+55050𝑡𝑡4+21531𝑡𝑡5+3338𝑡𝑡6)3(18+87𝑡𝑡+115𝑡𝑡2+42𝑡𝑡3)2 . (9) 
Note that both consumer surplus and social welfare increase with gross consumer benefit; that is, ∂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁∂𝑣𝑣 > 0 and ∂𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁∂𝑣𝑣 > 0. Thus, an increase in gross consumer benefit will make society better off. 
Further, social welfare always decreases with transportation cost, whereas consumer surplus increases 
with transportation cost when gross consumer benefit is high; that is, 
∂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 <>0 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣8, and ∂𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 < 0. 
3.2. A-integration 
We now consider the first case of port integration in which the public port merges with its neighboring 
private port, port 2, and the operator of the merged ports chooses a uniform price to maximize the 
social welfare. To ensure that the required conditions R hold in the A-integration case, we assume 
that 𝑣𝑣9 < 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣10. 
Substituting 𝑝𝑝12 = 𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝2 into Eqs. (2) and (4), we have the profit of port 3 and social welfare, 
respectively. The operator of the merged ports chooses 𝑝𝑝12 to maximize social welfare, and the 
operator of port 3 chooses 𝑝𝑝3 to maximize its profit. Differentiating 𝑊𝑊 and 𝜋𝜋3 with respect to 𝑝𝑝12 
and 𝑝𝑝3 yield the following prices of the port:  
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𝑝𝑝12𝐴𝐴 = 39𝑡𝑡+50𝑡𝑡2+4𝑡𝑡3+42𝑣𝑣+52𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+8𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣2(21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2) , 𝑝𝑝3𝐴𝐴 = (3+2𝑡𝑡)(9𝑡𝑡+6𝑡𝑡2+14𝑣𝑣+12𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)2(21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2) ,                  (10) 
where the superscript A denotes the equilibrium results in this integration case. Note that the price of 
the ports always increases with gross consumer benefit; that is, 
∂𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∂𝑣𝑣 > 0  where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 . 
Additionally, the effect of transportation cost on prices depends on gross consumer benefit; that is, ∂𝑝𝑝12𝐴𝐴∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣11, and ∂𝑝𝑝3𝐴𝐴∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣12. Thus, the prices of the merged and non-merged 
ports increase with transportation cost when gross consumer benefit is low, while they decrease when 
gross consumer benefit is high. 
The throughputs of the three ports are 𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 = 3(−3+𝑡𝑡+5𝑡𝑡2+10𝑣𝑣+10𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2 , 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 = 36+105𝑡𝑡+72𝑡𝑡2+6𝑣𝑣+8𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣2(21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2) , and 𝑞𝑞3𝐴𝐴 = 3(9𝑡𝑡+6𝑡𝑡2+14𝑣𝑣+12𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)2(21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2) . (11) 
Note that the port’s throughput always increases with gross consumer benefit, while it decreases with 
transportation cost; that is, 
∂𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∂𝑣𝑣 > 0 and ∂𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴∂𝑡𝑡 < 0. 
The profits of the port operators are  𝜋𝜋1𝐴𝐴 = 3(3+4𝑡𝑡)(3+8𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡2+4𝑣𝑣+2𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)(10𝑣𝑣+10𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣−3+𝑡𝑡+5𝑡𝑡2)2(21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2 ,  𝜋𝜋2𝐴𝐴 = (36+105𝑡𝑡+72𝑡𝑡2+6𝑣𝑣+8𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)(78𝑣𝑣+96𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+16𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣−36−27𝑡𝑡+28𝑡𝑡2+8𝑡𝑡3)8(21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2 , and 𝜋𝜋3𝐴𝐴 = 3(3+4𝑡𝑡)(9𝑡𝑡+6𝑡𝑡2+14𝑣𝑣+12𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)28(21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2 .                                            (12) 
The profit of the ports always increases with gross consumer benefit; that is, 
∂𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁∂𝑣𝑣 > 0. The effect of 
transportation cost on profits also depends on the location of the ports and gross consumer benefit. In 
particular, the profits of ports 1 and 3 always decrease with transportation cost, whereas the profit of 
port 2 increases (decreases) with transportation cost when gross consumer benefit is low (high); that 
is, 
∂𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 < 0, ∂𝜋𝜋3𝐴𝐴∂𝑡𝑡 < 0, and ∂𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁∂𝑡𝑡 >< 0 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣13. 
The consumer surplus and social welfare are, respectively, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡(12𝑡𝑡(249+484𝑡𝑡+236𝑡𝑡2)𝑣𝑣2+36𝑡𝑡(30+251𝑡𝑡+412𝑡𝑡2+192𝑡𝑡3)𝑣𝑣2−𝑡𝑡(2745+13668𝑡𝑡+22565𝑡𝑡2+14708𝑡𝑡3+3032𝑡𝑡4))4(21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2  and 
𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = 4�459+2079𝑡𝑡+2676𝑡𝑡2+1060𝑡𝑡3�𝑣𝑣2+4�405+2547𝑡𝑡+6249𝑡𝑡2+6316𝑡𝑡3+2216𝑡𝑡4�𝑣𝑣−810−5715𝑡𝑡−15657𝑡𝑡2−19733𝑡𝑡3−11396𝑡𝑡4−2408𝑡𝑡54(21+56𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2 .           (13) 
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Note that both consumer surplus and social welfare increase with gross consumer benefit; that is, ∂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴∂𝑣𝑣 > 0 and ∂𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴∂𝑣𝑣 > 0. In addition, consumer surplus decreases (increases) with transportation cost 
when gross consumer benefit is low (high), whereas social welfare always decreases with 
transportation cost; that is, 
∂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴∂𝑡𝑡 <>0 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣14, and ∂𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴∂𝑡𝑡 < 0. 
3.3. B-integration  
We finally consider the second case of port integration in which the public port merges with a non-
adjacent private port, port 3, and the operator of the merged ports chooses a uniform price to maximize 
social welfare. To ensure that the required conditions R hold in the B-integration case, we assume 
that 𝑣𝑣15 < 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣16. 
Substituting 𝑝𝑝13 = 𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝3 into Eqs. (2) and (4), we have the profit of port 2 and social welfare, 
respectively. The operator of the merged ports chooses 𝑝𝑝13 to maximize social welfare, and the 
operator of port 2 chooses 𝑝𝑝2 to maximize its profit. Differentiating 𝑊𝑊 and 𝜋𝜋2 with respect to 𝑝𝑝13 
and 𝑝𝑝2 yield the following prices of the ports: 𝑝𝑝13𝐵𝐵 = 6𝑡𝑡+9𝑡𝑡2+2𝑡𝑡3+6𝑣𝑣+12𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2 , 𝑝𝑝2𝐵𝐵 = 6(1+𝑡𝑡)(2𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡2+𝑣𝑣)6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2 ,                              (14) 
where the superscript B denotes the equilibrium results in this integration case. Note that the price of 
the ports always increases with gross consumer benefit; that is, 
∂𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵∂𝑣𝑣 > 0 where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3. The 
prices of the merged and non-merged ports also increase (decrease) with transportation cost when 
gross consumer benefit is low (high); that is, 
∂𝑝𝑝13𝐵𝐵∂𝑡𝑡 >< 0 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣17 and ∂𝑝𝑝2𝐵𝐵∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣18. 
The throughputs of the three ports are 𝑞𝑞1𝐵𝐵 = 6𝑡𝑡+5𝑡𝑡2+6𝑣𝑣+10𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2 , 𝑞𝑞2𝐵𝐵 = 6(2𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡2+𝑣𝑣)6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2, and 𝑞𝑞3𝐵𝐵 = 6𝑡𝑡+5𝑡𝑡2+6𝑣𝑣+10𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2 .               (15) 
Note that the throughput of the port always increases with gross consumer benefit, while it decreases 
with transportation cost; that is, 
∂𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵∂𝑣𝑣 > 0 and ∂𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵∂𝑡𝑡 < 0. 
The profits of the port operators are 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵 = (6𝑡𝑡+5𝑡𝑡2+6𝑣𝑣+10𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)(6𝑡𝑡+13𝑡𝑡2+4𝑡𝑡3+6𝑣𝑣+14𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)2(6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2)2 , 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵 = 18(1+2𝑡𝑡)(2𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡2+𝑣𝑣)2(6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2)2 , and 
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𝜋𝜋3𝐵𝐵 = (6𝑡𝑡+5𝑡𝑡2+6𝑣𝑣+10𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)(6𝑡𝑡+13𝑡𝑡2+4𝑡𝑡3+6𝑣𝑣+14𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)2(6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2)2 .                                 (16) 
Note that the profit of the ports always increases with gross consumer benefit; that is, 
∂𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵∂𝑣𝑣 > 0. 
Additionally, the profit of the ports increases (decreases) with transportation cost when gross 
consumer benefit is low (high); that is, 
∂𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣19, ∂𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣20, and ∂𝜋𝜋3𝐵𝐵∂𝑡𝑡 ><0 
when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣21. 
The consumer surplus and social welfare are, respectively, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡((99+180𝑡𝑡+100𝑡𝑡2)𝑣𝑣2+4𝑡𝑡(72+105𝑡𝑡+40𝑡𝑡2)𝑣𝑣−2(36+252𝑡𝑡+453𝑡𝑡2+288𝑡𝑡3+59𝑡𝑡4))
(6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2)2  and 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 = (54+279𝑡𝑡+320𝑡𝑡2+100𝑡𝑡3)𝑣𝑣2+4𝑡𝑡(3+2𝑡𝑡)(12+52𝑡𝑡+25𝑡𝑡2)𝑣𝑣−𝑡𝑡(2+𝑡𝑡)(36+180𝑡𝑡+201𝑡𝑡2+62𝑡𝑡3)
(6+21𝑡𝑡+10𝑡𝑡2)2 .    (17) 
Note that both consumer surplus and social welfare increase with gross consumer benefit; that is, ∂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵∂𝑣𝑣 > 0  and ∂𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵∂𝑣𝑣 > 0. Social welfare also always decreases with transportation cost, whereas 
consumer surplus increases with transportation cost when gross consumer benefit is high; that is, ∂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵∂𝑡𝑡 <>0 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣22 and ∂𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵∂𝑡𝑡 < 0. 
4. Comparison 
In the comparisons, we can show that the required conditions R in the three models are satisfied in 
the range of 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣.7 To investigate the effect of the different port integration cases on the 
equilibrium results, respectively, we compare the main results in the A-integration and B-integration 
with those in the N-integration.8  
Proposition 1: Comparing the equilibrium price and throughput of the ports in the integration models 
with those in the N-integration model, we have the following relationships: 
(i). Compared to A-integration: 𝑝𝑝1𝐴𝐴 <> 𝑝𝑝1𝑁𝑁 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣23, and 𝑝𝑝2𝐴𝐴 <> 𝑝𝑝2𝑁𝑁 and 𝑝𝑝3𝐴𝐴 <> 𝑝𝑝3𝑁𝑁 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣24; 
                                                                
7 To ensure analytic consistency with the outcomes of an endogenous port integration choice game in Section 
5, we define a comparable range of 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣, where 𝑣𝑣 = 𝑣𝑣29 and 𝑣𝑣 = min {𝑣𝑣2,𝑣𝑣10, 𝑣𝑣31}. For more details, 
see Appendix II. 
8 We compare the A-integration and B-integration to the T-integration case and discuss the results of an 
endogenous port integration choice game in Section 5. See footnote 9. 
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𝑞𝑞1𝐴𝐴 + 𝑞𝑞2𝐴𝐴 ><𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣25 and 𝑞𝑞3𝐴𝐴 <> 𝑞𝑞3𝑁𝑁 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣24; 
(ii). Compared to B-integration: 𝑝𝑝1𝐵𝐵 < 𝑝𝑝1𝑁𝑁, 𝑝𝑝2𝐵𝐵 < 𝑝𝑝2𝑁𝑁, and 𝑝𝑝3𝐵𝐵 < 𝑝𝑝3𝑁𝑁; 𝑞𝑞1𝐵𝐵 + 𝑞𝑞3𝐵𝐵 > 𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞3𝑁𝑁 and 𝑞𝑞2𝐵𝐵 < 𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁. 
Proposition 1 compares the prices and throughput changes of the ports between the no-
integration case and each alternative integration case in a mixed market. It states that the effect of 
port integration on prices and throughputs crucially depends on the types of integration and values of 
gross consumer benefit. 
On the one hand, A-integration decreases (increases) the price of each port when gross consumer 
benefit is low (high). That is, the effect of A-integration on prices depends on gross consumer benefit. 
Thus, A-integration can lead to a lower price at each port in a mixed market when gross consumer 
benefit is low, which can benefit the consumer (the shipper). Furthermore, A-integration yields a 
larger throughput of the merged port and a smaller throughput of the non-merged port under low gross 
consumer benefit, and the opposite result could be found otherwise. Thus, the non-merged port gains 
a smaller (larger) market share under low (high) gross consumer benefit.  
On the other hand, B-integration always decreases the price of each port, while it increases 
(decreases) the throughput of the merged (non-merged) port. Our results are in contrast with those in 
a private oligopoly. Xing et al. (2018) showed that (i) port integration always leads to a higher price 
in a private oligopoly setting and (ii) port integration always leads to a smaller total throughput of the 
merged ports and a larger throughput of the non-merged port. In a mixed oligopoly setting, however, 
we show that the integration of a public and non-adjacent private port will always lead to a lower 
price at each port, and thus that shippers benefit from B-integration. In addition, B-integration always 
yields a larger throughput of the merged ports and a smaller throughput of the non-merged port, 
independent of gross consumer benefit. Thus, the non-merged port always gains a smaller market 
share under B-integration. 
Proposition 2: Comparing the profit of the ports in the integration models with those in the N-
integration model, we have the following relationships: 
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(i). Compared to A-integration: 𝜋𝜋1𝐴𝐴 + 𝜋𝜋2𝐴𝐴 <>𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁 + 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣26 and 𝜋𝜋3𝐴𝐴 <>𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣24; 
(ii). Compared to B-integration; 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵 + 𝜋𝜋3𝐵𝐵 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁 + 𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁 and 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵 < 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁. 
Proposition 2 compares the profit changes of the port in the no-integration and the two 
integration cases, which reveals the profit incentive for port integration. It states that the effect of port 
integration on profits depends on the type of integration and the value of gross consumer benefit.  
On the one hand, A-integration decreases (increases) the profits of the merged and non-merged 
ports under low (high) gross consumer benefit. As Proposition 1 shows, when gross consumer benefit 
is low, the price of the two merged ports decreases while the throughput of the two ports increases. 
The former price effect outweighs the latter throughput effect; thus, the joint profits of the merged 
ports decrease under low gross consumer benefit. In addition, the profit of the non-merged port in the 
A-integration case also decreases when gross consumer benefit is low. In sum, when the public port 
merges with its neighboring private port, all ports are less profitable under low gross consumer benefit, 
though they are more profitable when gross consumer benefit is high.  
On the other hand, B-integration always decreases the profits of the merged and non-merged 
ports, independent of gross consumer benefit. That is, B-integration makes all three ports more 
profitable in a mixed market. Our results are also in contrast to Xing et al. (2018) in a private oligopoly 
where port integration always increases the profits of the merged and non-merged ports in a private 
oligopoly. As Proposition 1 shows, B-integration leads to a lower price and larger throughput for the 
merged ports. The former price effect outweighs the latter throughput effect; thus, the joint profits of 
the merged ports always decrease under B-integration. Further, for the non-merged port, B-integration 
yields a lower price and a smaller throughput, and thereby reduces its profit. Thus, all ports are less 
profitable under B-integration. 
Proposition 3: Comparing consumer surplus and social welfare among the three models, we have 
the following relationships: 
(i). Compared to A-integration, 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 ><𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣27 and 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 ><𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣28; 
(ii). Compared to B-integration, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 > 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁; 
Proposition 3 compares the consumer surplus and welfare changes among the three models. It 
states that the effect of port integration on consumer surplus and social welfare depends on the types 
of integration and value of gross consumer benefit.  
On the one hand, when gross consumer benefit is low, A-integration reduces the producer surplus 
and improves consumer surplus. The latter effect outweighs the former effect; thus, A-integration 
improves social welfare when gross consumer benefit is low, and the opposite result could be found 
when the gross consumer benefit is high.  
On the other hand, B-integration always reduces producer surplus and improves consumer 
surplus, independent of gross consumer benefit. The latter effect outweighs the former effect; thus, 
B-integration always improves social welfare. Our results also contrast with Xing et al. (2018), who 
showed that port integration always reduces both consumer surplus and social welfare in a private 
oligopoly. From the social welfare perspective, this study shows that A-integration between the public 
port and its neighboring private port makes society better off only under low gross consumer benefit, 
whereas B-integration between the public port and a non-adjacent private port always makes society 
better off. 
5. Endogenous Integration Game 
We now consider an endogenous port integration game among the three ports under price competition in 
which each port simultaneously chooses whether to integrate or not. Then, the public port will integrate 
with one or both of the private ports if the integration improves social welfare, whereas the private ports 
will integrate with one or both other ports if the integration generates more profits. Table 1 shows the 
payoff matrix of this integration choice game. 
[Table 1 should be located here] 
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In Table 1, we denote C-integration as a private integration case in which two neighboring private ports 
merge to compete with a public port, and T-integration as the total integration case in which all three 
ports merge into one comprehensive port. 
Then, we have the following conditions for an equilibrium of this endogenous port integration game: 
(i). (𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼) is an equilibrium if 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶, 𝜋𝜋2𝑇𝑇 ≥ 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵, and 𝜋𝜋3𝑇𝑇 ≥ 𝜋𝜋3𝐴𝐴;  
(ii). (𝐼𝐼,𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼) is an equilibrium if 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁, 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝜋𝜋2𝑇𝑇, and 𝜋𝜋3𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁;  
(iii). (𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼,𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼) is an equilibrium if 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁, 𝜋𝜋2𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁, and 𝜋𝜋3𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝜋𝜋3𝑇𝑇;  
(iv). (𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼) is an equilibrium if 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇, 𝜋𝜋2𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁, and 𝜋𝜋3𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁;  
(v). (𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼,𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼,𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼) is an equilibrium if 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁, 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁, and 𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁.  
Below, we examine two more integration cases for further analysis: C-integration and T-
integration, respectively. 
5.1. C-integration 
We first consider the C-integration case in which the two private ports merge, and the operator of the 
merged ports chooses a uniform price to maximize its joint profits. Then, the required conditions R 
in the C-integration case is that 𝑣𝑣29 < 𝑣𝑣 < min {𝑣𝑣30, 𝑣𝑣31}. 
Substituting 𝑝𝑝23 = 𝑝𝑝2 = 𝑝𝑝3 into Eqs. (2) and (4), we have the joint profits of the two private 
ports and social welfare, respectively. Differentiating 𝑊𝑊 and 𝜋𝜋2 + 𝜋𝜋3 with respect to 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝23 
yield the following price of the ports: 𝑝𝑝1𝐶𝐶 = 21𝑡𝑡+44𝑡𝑡2+12𝑡𝑡3+46𝑣𝑣+96𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+8𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣2(23+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)  and 𝑝𝑝23𝐶𝐶 = 41𝑡𝑡+86𝑡𝑡2+36𝑡𝑡3+46𝑣𝑣+76𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+24𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣2(23+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2) ,          (18) 
where the superscript C denotes the equilibrium results in this integration case. Note that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶 > 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁, 
where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3. That is, C-integration between two private ports always increases the price of the 
three ports.  
The throughputs of the three ports are 𝑞𝑞1𝐶𝐶 = 12+47𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2+34𝑣𝑣+68𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣2(23+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2) , 𝑞𝑞2𝐶𝐶 = 36+119𝑡𝑡+56𝑡𝑡2+10𝑣𝑣−8𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣2(23+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2) , and 𝑞𝑞3𝐶𝐶 = 32𝑣𝑣+22𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣−9−8𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡223+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2 .  (19) 
Note that 𝑞𝑞2𝐶𝐶 + 𝑞𝑞3𝐶𝐶 < 𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞3𝑁𝑁 and 𝑞𝑞1𝐶𝐶 < 𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁. Thus, C-integration always decreases the throughput 
of the merged and non-merged ports. 
The profits of the port operators are  
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𝜋𝜋1𝐶𝐶 = (12+47𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2+34𝑣𝑣+68𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)(58𝑣𝑣+124𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+16𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣−12−5𝑡𝑡+54𝑡𝑡2+24𝑡𝑡3)8(23+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2 , 𝜋𝜋2𝐶𝐶 = (36+119𝑡𝑡+56𝑡𝑡2+10𝑣𝑣−8𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣)(82𝑣𝑣+160𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+48𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣−36−37𝑡𝑡+116𝑡𝑡2+72𝑡𝑡3)8(23+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2 , and 𝜋𝜋3𝐶𝐶 = (32𝑣𝑣+22𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣−9−8𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡2)(9+49𝑡𝑡+87𝑡𝑡2+36𝑡𝑡3+14𝑣𝑣+54𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+24𝑡𝑡2𝑣𝑣)2(23+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2 .                        (20) 
Note that 𝜋𝜋2𝐶𝐶 + 𝜋𝜋3𝐶𝐶 ><𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁 + 𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁  when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣32  and 𝜋𝜋1𝐶𝐶 ><𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁  when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣33 . In other words, the 
effect of C-integration on the port’s profit crucially depends on the value of gross consumer benefit. 
In particular, C-integration between the two private ports increases (decreases) the profits of the 
merged port and independent public port when gross consumer benefit is low (high). That is, when 
two private ports integrate, all ports are better off under low gross consumer benefit, and the opposite 
result could be found when the gross consumer benefit is high.  
The consumer surplus and social welfare are, respectively, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑡𝑡(4(779+1324𝑡𝑡+708𝑡𝑡2)𝑣𝑣2+4(420+2543𝑡𝑡+3076𝑡𝑡2+1104𝑡𝑡3)𝑣𝑣−3209−18596𝑡𝑡−34649𝑡𝑡2−24060𝑡𝑡3−5528𝑡𝑡4)4(23+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2  and 
𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶 = 4�573+2935𝑡𝑡+3324𝑡𝑡2+1060𝑡𝑡3�𝑣𝑣2+4�441+3337𝑡𝑡+8681𝑡𝑡2+7476𝑡𝑡3+2024𝑡𝑡4�𝑣𝑣−882−7355𝑡𝑡−22083𝑡𝑡2−28297𝑡𝑡3−15796𝑡𝑡4−3176𝑡𝑡54(23+70𝑡𝑡+34𝑡𝑡2)2 .             (21) 
Note that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 < 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁  and 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶 < 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 . Thus, C-integration between two private ports always 
reduces both consumer surplus and social welfare. 
5.2. T-integration 
We now consider the T-integration case in which all the three ports merge into a single port, and the 
operator of the merged ports chooses a welfare-maximizing uniform price. Then, the required 
conditions R in the T-integration case is that 𝑣𝑣 > 𝑣𝑣34. 
Substituting 𝑝𝑝123 = 𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝2 = 𝑝𝑝3 into Eq. (4), we have social welfare. Differentiating social 
welfare with respect to 𝑝𝑝123 yields the following equilibrium price: 𝑝𝑝123𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡+2𝑣𝑣2(1+𝑡𝑡),                                                             (22) 
where the superscript T denotes the equilibrium results in this total integration case. Note that 𝑝𝑝1𝑇𝑇 <𝑝𝑝1𝐷𝐷 , 𝑝𝑝3𝑇𝑇 < 𝑝𝑝3𝐷𝐷 , and 𝑝𝑝2𝑇𝑇 <>𝑝𝑝2𝐷𝐷  when 𝑣𝑣 <>𝑣𝑣35 . That is, T-integration among the three ports always 
decreases the price of the port with the private hinterlands (ports 1 and 3); however, it decreases the 
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price of the middle port (port 2) when gross consumer benefit is low, and the opposite result could be 
found when the gross consumer benefit is high. 
The throughputs of the three ports are 𝑞𝑞1𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡+2𝑣𝑣2(1+𝑡𝑡), 𝑞𝑞2𝑇𝑇 = 1, and 𝑞𝑞3𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡+2𝑣𝑣2(1+𝑡𝑡).                                         (23) 
Note that 𝑞𝑞1𝑇𝑇 + 𝑞𝑞2𝑇𝑇 + 𝑞𝑞3𝑇𝑇 ><𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁 + 𝑞𝑞3𝑁𝑁  when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣36 . In other words, T-integration increases 
(decreases) the total throughput of the port under low (high) gross consumer benefit. 
The profits of the port operators are 𝜋𝜋1𝑇𝑇 = (𝑡𝑡+2𝑣𝑣)28(1+𝑡𝑡)2, 𝜋𝜋2𝑇𝑇 = 2𝑣𝑣−12(1+𝑡𝑡), and 𝜋𝜋3𝑇𝑇 = (𝑡𝑡+2𝑣𝑣)28(1+𝑡𝑡)2.                                   (24) 
Note that 𝜋𝜋1𝑇𝑇 + 𝜋𝜋2𝑇𝑇 + 𝜋𝜋3𝑇𝑇 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁 + 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁 + 𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁. That is, T-integration always decreases the profit of the 
merged port. Thus, all three ports are less profitable when they merge. 
The consumer surplus and social welfare are, respectively, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡(4𝑣𝑣+8𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+4𝑣𝑣2−5−8𝑡𝑡−2𝑡𝑡2)4(1+𝑡𝑡)2  and 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 = 4𝑣𝑣+8𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣+4𝑣𝑣2−2−5𝑡𝑡−2𝑡𝑡24(1+𝑡𝑡) .                    (25) 
Note that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 ><𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣37. In other words, T-integration always improves 
consumer surplus, while it improves (reduces) social welfare under low (high) gross consumer benefit. 
5.3. Equilibrium of an endogenous integration game 
We can show that the required conditions R are satisfied in the range of 𝑣𝑣 = 𝑣𝑣29 < 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣 =
min {𝑣𝑣2, 𝑣𝑣10, 𝑣𝑣31}. Then, we have the following propositions.9  
Proposition 4: In the port integration choice game, 
(i). N-integration is a unique Nash equilibrium; 
(ii). A-integration, B-integration, C-integration, and T-integration are not Nash equilibria. 
Proposition 4 states that ports can choose only competition (no integration) endogenously in a 
mixed market. As in Proposition 3 (ii), for instance, 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 > 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁; thus, N-integration never yields the 
                                                                
9 We present the proofs of some propositions in Appendix III.  
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highest social welfare. Consequently, N-integration is a unique Nash equilibrium if there is no 
government intervention, though it is not socially desirable. 
In the below analysis, we consider the case in which the government provides a side payment to the 
private ports when it merges with the public port, the size of which depends on the types of integration. 
In particular, we assume that the government provides side payments 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵, and 𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 to the private 
port under A-integration, B-integration, and T-integration, respectively, and examine an endogenous 
port integration game with the government’s side payments. Table 2 shows the payoff matrix of this port 
integration choice game with side payments. 
[Table 2 should be located here] 
Then, we have the following three revised conditions for an equilibrium of an endogenous port 
integration game with side payments:10 
(i). (𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼) is an equilibrium if 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶, 𝜋𝜋2𝑇𝑇 + 𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 ≥ 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵, and 𝜋𝜋3𝑇𝑇 + 𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 ≥ 𝜋𝜋3𝐴𝐴; 
(ii).  (𝐼𝐼,𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼) is an equilibrium if 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁, 𝜋𝜋2𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝜋𝜋2𝑇𝑇 + 𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇, and 𝜋𝜋3𝐵𝐵 + 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝜋𝜋3𝑁𝑁; 
(iii). (𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼,𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼) is an equilibrium if 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁, 𝜋𝜋2𝐴𝐴 + 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁, and 𝜋𝜋3𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝜋𝜋3𝑇𝑇 + 𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇. 
Proposition 5: In the port integration choice game with side payments, 
(i). N-integration and B-integration are always Nash equilibria; 
(ii). C-integration is not a Nash equilibrium; 
(iii). A-integration is a Nash equilibrium when 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣 ≤ 𝑣𝑣28;  
(iv). T-integration is a Nash equilibrium when 0.19 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0.78 and 𝑣𝑣46 ≤ 𝑣𝑣 ≤ v42. 
Proposition 5 demonstrates that the ports can choose either integration or competition as 
equilibria under the appropriate government side payments. First, N-integration and B-integration are 
always Nash equilibria, whereas C-integration between two private ports is not a Nash equilibrium, 
even with side payments. This is because 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 < 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶 < 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁, and thus, the government 
                                                                
10 We can also consider a unified side payment in which the government provides the side payment to the 
merged private ports in each integration case; that is, 𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 = 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴 = 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵 = 𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 . However, we can find no value of 𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈 that satisfies the three revised conditions. The details are available from the authors upon request. 
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will provide side payments to the private port only when the public and private ports integrate. In 
particular, under B-integration where the public port merges with a non-adjacent private port and 
maximizes social welfare, the government can propose an incentive-compatible side payment to 
increase the private port’s profit. Then, compared with Proposition 4, where the side payment does 
not exist, the government can achieve higher welfare, namely, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 > 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁. Note 
that B-integration is politically possible only when the public finances can support the required side 
payment, which we discuss in the analysis below. 
Second, either A-integration or T-integration could be Nash equilibria with side payments 
depending on the value of gross consumer benefit and transportation costs. In particular, A-integration 
is a Nash equilibrium when gross consumer benefit is low, whereas T-integration is a Nash 
equilibrium when transportation cost is low and gross consumer benefit is intermediate.  
In Figure 3, we illustrate the possible ranges of the port integrations as Nash equilibria in an 
endogenous port integration choice game with side payments:11  
(a). B-integration and N-integration are Nash equilibria in region I;  
(b). B-integration, N-integration, and T-integration are Nash equilibria in region II;  
(c). A-integration, B-integration, and N-integration are Nash equilibria in region III. 
[Figure 3 should be located here] 
The figure shows that (i) A-integration can be a Nash equilibrium in region III as the transportation 
cost increases given the gross consumer benefit. Additionally, (ii) T-integration can be a Nash 
equilibrium in region II as gross consumer benefit increases only when the transportation cost is at an 
intermediate level. However, under A-integration and T-integration, we can show that side payments 
s𝐴𝐴 and s𝑇𝑇 are not supported by the public finances in region III or region II, respectively, where 
they can be Nash equilibria. That is, we can show that 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 −𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 < s𝐴𝐴 in region III and thus the 
                                                                
11 Regarding welfare comparisons in each case, we can show that (i) A-integration yields higher (lower) social 
welfare than B-integration when gross consumer benefit is low (high); that is, 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 ><𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵  when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣38 . 
However, (ii) T-integration yields higher (lower) social welfare than A-integration or B-integration when gross 
consumer benefit is low (high); that is 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 <>𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣40 and 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 <>𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 when 𝑣𝑣 <> 𝑣𝑣41. 
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side pavement under A-integration s𝐴𝐴 is possible only when the government uses revenues from 
other sources, which might cause an excess burden of taxation and welfare loss.12 We also show that 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 −𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 < 2s𝑇𝑇 in region II and thus the side payment under T-integration s𝑇𝑇 is not supported by 
the public finances. Therefore, side payments under A-integration and T-integration might lead to 
political conflicts. 
Proposition 6: In the Nash equilibrium of the port integration choice game with side payments, B-
integration is socially desirable when the transportation cost is low; that is, 0 < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0.13, and 
0.13 < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 3.43 and 𝑣𝑣41 ≤ 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣; while public finances support side payment 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵  when gross 
consumer benefit and the transportation cost are low; that is, 0.46 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0.66 and 𝑣𝑣 < 𝑣𝑣 ≤ 𝑣𝑣44. 
Proposition 6 implies that B-integration in which the public port merges with a non-adjacent private 
port can be an equilibrium of an endogenous port integration choice game. Additionally, it is socially 
desirable if the government can carefully provide an appropriate side payment, which is supported by 
public finances under certain conditions. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This study investigated the effect of port integration under price competition in a mixed oligopoly 
setting in which a public port compete with private ports under different ownership structures. We 
compared A-integration between the public port and its neighboring private port and B-integration 
between the public port and a non-adjacent private port, and found that the effect of A-integration on 
price, throughput, and the profits of each port depends on gross consumer benefit, whereas the effect 
of B-integration on equilibrium results is independent of gross consumer benefit. In particular, all 
ports are less (more) profitable when gross consumer benefit is low (high) under A-integration, 
whereas they are always less profitable under B-integration. We also showed that A-integration makes 
society better off only when gross consumer benefit is low, whereas B-integration always makes 
                                                                
12 Laffont and Tirole (1986) and Lin and Tan (1999) argue that the government’s public finances might cause 
welfare loss. For example, public finance has its own distorting effects on labor supply or consumption, which 
can create an excess burden as a tax on labor income. For recent analyses of an excess burden of taxation in a 
mixed market, see Matsumura and Tomaru (2013, 2015), Xu and Lee (2018), and Leal et al. (2019). 
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society better off. Finally, we examined an endogenous port choice game and showed that ports can 
choose either integration or competition as Nash equilibria under appropriate government side 
payments. However, only B-integration with side payments can be socially desirable and supported 
by public finance. 
We address the limitations of this study. First, we could not incorporate the effects of practical 
market factors such as product differentiation or competition within the ports, between terminals, or 
with other port terminals. Second, the partial ownership structures of the ports could be further 
analyzed. Finally, future studies could extend the present study by integrating some important policy 
instruments such as government subsidies and other policies for a better understanding of the results.  
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